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Fuelish Thoughts

by David Wyndham 1. October 2005 00:00
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Even adjusting for inflation, aviation fuel prices are at their highest point and operators  all across aviation are feeling the hit. What can you do as an operator to try and mitigate these price increases?
 
Wash your airplane. This does two things, one it allows you to work off some of the frustration at the price of fuel, and two, it removes bugs and dirt that increase drag and rob you of fuel. While you are at it, clean the interior. No airplane has too much payload capability and there is no need to carry around excess. Dirt, empty bottles, outdated maps are all weight that is not needed. And as you know, heavy airplanes burn more fuel than light ones.
 
Get out your caulk gun. Not really, but poor seals around doors and windows also can rob you of the smooth airflow the fuel efficient flying demands. Checking your control rigging to make sure that the controls are correct in their position also can help reduce drag. I know this sounds more like something an air racer would do, but a little but here and there adds up. Doing the above may only net you one percent reduction in fuel used, but it's something.
 
One big way to save fuel is to slow down. Airplanes save time, time is money, etc. However, reducing from maximum cruise to a lower, more fuel friendly, power setting can save money. A Cessna 206 at 8,000 feet burns anywhere between 11 and 15 gallons per hour, depending on power settings. Even adjusting for speed, the lower power setting reduces fuel consumed per mile by 9%. At $4 per gallon that is like getting a $0.36 per gallon discount. In a Citation II, the difference between High Speed Cruise and Long Range Cruise saves about 5% in fuel consumed per mile.
 
Choosing your altitude wisely can also reduce fuel used. While ATC doesn't always accommodate, the longer your trip, the better off you are flying high. Get back into the performance charts and figure out the best combinations of power and altitude for your airplane.
 
Shop around. If there are multiple FBO's, see who has the better prices. GlobalAir.com and others offer fuel price reports for most FBO's in the US. Use your airport guide and call. Ask if there are discounts at home station.  There may be club discounts, association discounts, etc. available.  Maybe the FBO at your home has a pre-purchase option. Sure, I doubt you'd get a positive response with your small piston, but you never know unless you ask. So, ask.
 
Tanker fuel. If fuel on the road is higher in cost than fuel at home, carry as much extra fuel on board as you can to minimize the cost. Do keep in mind that carrying extra weight causes you to burn more fuel in longer climb times and higher fuel burns at cruise. In a Cessna 206, the fuel used to climb to 8000 feet at 3300 lbs take-off weight is 27% more than at 3000 lbs. In a Citation II, a thousand extra pounds of weight increases your fuel flow at altitude by about 8%. Again, get into your performance charts and figure out the penalty for carrying extra weight and see what the cost versus savings is when tankering fuel.
 
Do you have other fuel saving tips? Do you tanker fuel, and if so do you have a rule of thumb that you use? Reply back and let me know.

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David Wyndham

Understanding Your Costs

by David Wyndham 1. October 2005 00:00
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You are responsible for all the costs in your aviation operation. If you have little detail in those costs, then you have little control. You need to understand, collect, and organize your costs in order to manage them effectively. Otherwise, you may find the aviation function as fleeting as a summer vacation!

It's not enough to know how much your aviation cost last year, or that you hired a new pilot, or even that your aircraft cost $1,000 per hour to "operate." You should know more.

Why? You can't control what you can't measure. If you don't have sufficient detail in your aviation costs, you can't expect to be able to manage them. In about five years' worth of typical turbine aircraft utilization, you will spend as much money operating an aircraft as it costs. Other than overhauls and refurbishments, most of the operating costs go out the door in small enough increments that we don't realize their total magnitude.

You need to know the costs for each aircraft tail number and for each location. Because, if you have multiple aircraft even all the same make/ model, how will you make the case when to replace an aircraft?

You need to track your maintenance costs in detail. The high-dollar part deserves your attention, but so do the moderate cost parts that are consumed at a fast rate. What are your highest cost parts? What are your most frequently replaced parts? What system on the aircraft consumes the most parts dollars? You should track maintenance labor in a similar way.

Once the costs are collected, you need to organize them. Categories of costs may include insurance, training, marketing, maintenance parts, maintenance labor - contract, hangar lease, utilities, etc. Your situation will dictate what cost categories you need.

There are software applications that can enable you to track your aircraft costs – some as simple as a spreadsheet and other as complex as any accounting system. The basic minimum requirement for cost tracking is that it collects and organizes the costs in a way that is useful to you.

In organizing your aviation costs, it helps to consider the behavior of the cost. How will costs change with changes in utilization? Or, how does the cost behave with a change in activity?

A Variable Cost will vary in proportion to the level of activity. As activity increases, the total cost will increase but the cost per unit will remain constant. A good example of this is fuel. An increase in hours flown will have a corresponding increase in fuel consumed. However, the cost per gallon of fuel will not be affected. Guaranteed maintenance programs, catering costs, landing fees and overnight expenses will also vary in relation to how much flying is done. If you use contract flight crew, that would also be considered as a variable cost.

A Fixed Cost as the name implies, remains essentially constant for a given period or level of activity. A pilot's salary is a fixed cost. Whether you fly a little or a lot, the pilot still is paid their same salary. The cost per unit will change with a change in activity. The hangar cost, insurance, cost of refresher training, flight publications are all considered as fixed costs.

This just touches the tip of the iceberg that is operating costs. Before you can control and manage those costs, you need to collect and understand them. Because, "You Can't Control What You Can't Measure."

How do you collect and separate out your operating costs? What software (if any) do you use? Drop me a line and let me know. Give us your input it's, passing your knowledge to others helps us all in the long run.

Flight Into Known Icing Conditions

by Greg Reigel 1. October 2005 00:00
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Winter will be here soon. And with the arrival of colder temperatures, flight service station briefings will more often than not include the perennial "AIRMET ‘X' for occasional light to moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation." Thus, the timing is good for review of a recent National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") decision relating to flight into known icing conditions and the FAA's position regarding such operations.

The Facts

The case, Administrator v. Curtis, arose from the FAA's investigation of an accident at Payne Field in Everett, Washington in which an aircraft ran off the runway and was substantially damaged. Prior to taking off from Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington on the ill-fated flight, the airman, Mr. Curtis, who was a flight instructor and also pilot in command for the flight, obtained a computerized weather briefing and also contacted ATC for a briefing. The briefings revealed overcast skies and a temperature at Payne Field at 1 p.m. of 2 degrees Celsius with cloud tops at 2100 feet.

The airman then took off at 2:30 p.m. with a student on an IFR instructional flight during which the student was going to practice instrument approaches at Payne Field. The student flew the aircraft and the airman was responsible for all radio communications. Upon executing the first missed approach, the airman observed ice on the aircraft's wings. The airman and his student then returned to Payne Field for a landing that ultimately resulted in an accident.

After investigating the accident, the FAA initiated enforcement proceedings against the airman. The FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action ("NPCA") charging the airman with violation of FAR's 91.9(a)(prohibiting operation of an aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved flight manual, markings and placards which, in this case prohibited operations into known icing conditions) and 91.13(a)(prohibiting careless and reckless operation so as to endanger the life or property of another). The NPCA also ordered a 90-day suspension of the airman's certificate (although the case does not indicate which certificate, presumably the suspension applied to the airman's commercial pilot certificate rather than his certified flight instructor ("CFI") certificate since the airman would otherwise still be able to fly if only his CFI certificate were suspended). The airman timely appealed the NPCA to the NTSB and requested an evidentiary hearing on the issues.

The Evidentiary Hearing

At the hearing, the FAA presented evidence that the airman had ignored two pilot reports ("pireps") to the sector controller of rime icing, which the airman should have heard on his radio. An expert witness also testified on the FAA's behalf stating that the airman should have known from the weather report and briefing that he would have to descend and ascend into clouds at Payne Field to perform missed approaches and that the weather was such that icing was possible. With this knowledge, the expert witness testified that the airman shouldn't have even initiated the flight. Finally, the airman's student testified at the hearing that the airman actually pointed out ice on the wing to the student prior to execution of the missed approach. Based upon this testimony, the FAA argued that the airman should have taken remedial action and either landed immediately or flown above the clouds to an airport where he could land under VFR conditions free of the risk of accumulating ice on the aircraft.

Although the airman argued that he didn't hear the pireps, that he didn't see the ice until after the missed approach and that he acted reasonably upon discovering the ice buildup, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") didn't buy it. The ALJ found that the airman should have heard the pireps and that he should have known the flight would be occurring in conditions conducive to icing. The ALJ affirmed the FAA's order suspending the airman's certificate for 90-days for violations of FAR's 91.9(a) and 91.13(a).

The Appeal To The Board

The airman then appealed to the full NTSB. He made a number of arguments to the Board, all of which were summarily dismissed. First, he argued that the testimony of his student was not credible. However, based upon the long established principle that credibility determinations are exclusively for the ALJ to make, the Board quickly rejected this argument. Next, the airman argued that the case law regarding "known icing conditions" didn't apply to his situation because the pireps, regardless of whether he actually heard them, were not stated as within his flight path and, thus, he didn't have to give them any consideration. The Board disagreed, noting "[i]t would have been prudent, at a minimum, to query ATC when a report of icing in his sector was broadcast so that he could assess the threat. He failed to do so. Absent clarification that the icing was not a threat to his aircraft, he risked flying into known icing conditions."

Finally, the airman argued that the ALJ's interpretation of the "operation into known icing conditions" case law was too broad and more theory than fact. Although the Board didn't need to address this argument to affirm the ALJ's decision, it responded that "[p]ilots are required to obtain all information pertinent to their flight – that is, be well prepared – and make reasoned decisions based on that information. Here, respondent knew that he would be flying into clouds that contained moisture, knew that the temperature on the ground at his destination was close to freezing, and knew that in the cloudy skies on the way to and above Payne Field the temperature would be colder. The risk of icing was clear. Respondent nevertheless chose to make the flight, and to continue it when further evidence of actual icing or reported icing presented itself, all with predicable consequences. In our view, doing so was clear error, in violation of the cited regulations and especially egregious in the case of a flight instructor."

Conclusions

The Board's decision affirming the ALJ's decision is consistent with the case law indicating that "operation into known icing conditions" includes operation into "forecast" icing conditions. Unfortunately, if you fly in the upper half of the United States or Alaska and interpret this case law literally, the standard AIRMET for icing would ground you for almost all flights during the winter months except days with "severe clear" weather conditions. However, don't put your aircraft away for the winter just yet.

Unlike FAR Part 135 governing commercial operations which has some very specific restrictions regarding operation in "known icing" conditions, FAR Part 91 governing most general aviation operations allows a pilot to exercise greater discretion in making the judgment as to whether a flight can be safely conducted during the winter months. However, the discretion afforded to and, indeed, demanded of a pilot operating under Part 91 has limits.

When operating under Part 91, you cannot exercise that discretion carelessly or recklessly, lest you violate FAR 91.13. If you exercise poor judgment and fly into icing conditions which you knew or should have known about based upon all of the information available to you, you are likely to be sanctioned if discovered. But, if you have more accurate information that contradicts a forecast of icing conditions or information upon which you can reasonably base a decision that your flight will not be susceptible to the risk associated with the forecast icing conditions, then your risk of successful enforcement action is diminished.

Unfortunately, the issue of flight into known icing conditions does not have any simple answers. Each situation will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. If you exercise your judgment reasonably and prudently, you will not only keep yourself and your passengers safe, you will also minimize your exposure to FAA enforcement action.

Winter flying can be some of the best flying you will experience. It can also be some of the most unforgiving. Thus, the broad interpretation of "known icing conditions." Yet, if you fly safe and smart, you can continue to fly throughout the winter without risking life and limb, or your airman certificate.

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Greg Reigel

Multi-Engine vs. Single-Engine

by Jeremy Cox 1. October 2005 00:00
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Recently I had a client ask me for my professional opinion regarding a specific aircraft that he was interested in possibly buying. He wanted to know: ‘What I thought about the Pilatus PC12 as a possible corporate aircraft for his company to own and operate?' He normally charters a BE400A and a CE525 CJ and has wanted to become less reliant on Charter by owning his own aircraft. He was very impressed by the cabin size, range, speed, and most impressive to him, the operating cost of the ‘big-bus' Pilatus. Other than having worked for the principle British investor who owned Pilatus in the 1980's in England, many, many lifetimes ago and during this period I got to mix with the then Pilatus executives and test pilots that where pushing the PC7 and the then new PC9, I really was not able to answer my clients question based on personal experience and therefore had to do some research. Well I must tell you that other than for the purchase price, the PC12 really stacked up against the King Air 200 for instance. The PC12 is longer than a King Air 200 (47.25 feet versus 43.75), has a slightly less wingspan (41.58 feet versus 54.50 feet), has approximately the same cabin length (16.90 feet versus 16.70 feet), has a wider cabin (5.00 feet versus 4.50 feet), more cabin volume in cubic feet (330 versus 303), carries more payload (with full fuel, 1,271 Lbs versus 395 Lbs), has more range (1,700 NM versus 1,600 NM), flies 10KTAS slower (265KTAS versus 275KTAS) and costs approximately 47% less to operate (Fuel @ $2.60/USG + Maintenance and Engine Reserves, $330/Hr versus $709/Hr.) The kicker is that used, it costs approximately twice as much as a King Air 200 to purchase ($2,300,000) versus ($1,200,000) and only has one Engine. Well after being made to ponder the significance of the comparison that I had just made, I thought that a visit to the Aircraft Accidents/Incidents page of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) website which is (http://ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp), was in order to further my research. I performed the following queries of the NTSB database:

 

All events between 1/1/2000 to 10/27/2005 for ‘PC-12'

 

Then,

 

All events between 1/1/2000 to 10/27/2005 for BE 200

Here is what each query returned:

Pilatus PC-12 (Single Engine)

Type of Event

Number

Fatal Accident

2

Non Fatal

7

Incidents

1

Engine Failure (Fatal/Non-Fatal/Incidents)

2

 

Data from Amstat Corporation (http://www.amstatcorp.com/)

Active Worldwide

564

Active in the USA

370

 

 

Beechcraft BE 200 (Multi Engine)

Type of Event

Number

Fatal Accident

11

Non Fatal

21

Incidents

3

Engine Failure (Fatal/Non-Fatal/Incidents)

2

 

 

Data from Amstat Corporation (http://www.amstatcorp.com/)

Active Worldwide

2,521

Active in the USA

1,153

 

Now let's crunch these numbers:

There are 1,957 More BE 200 Aircraft in current operation Worldwide, than PC-12 Aircraft (2,521 – 564 = 1,957); Which makes the BE 200 346.9% more prolific Worldwide than the PC-12.

 

There are 783 More BE 200 Aircraft in current operation in the USA, than PC-12 Aircraft (1,153 – 370 = 783); Which makes the BE 200 211.6% more prolific Stateside than the PC-12.

According to its website, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant accidents in the other modes of transportation, and issuing safety recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. The Safety Board determines the probable cause of all U.S. civil aviation accidents and certain public-use aircraft accidents. Additionally the NTSB is responsible for maintaining the government's database of civil aviation accidents and also conducts special studies of transportation safety issues of national significance. The NTSB provides investigators to serve as U.S. Accredited Representatives as specified in international treaties for aviation accidents overseas involving U.S. registered aircraft, or involving aircraft or major components of U.S. manufacture. The NTSB also serves as the "court of appeals" for any airman, mechanic or mariner whenever certificate action is taken by the Federal Aviation Administration or the U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, or when civil penalties are assessed by the FAA. Since I don't have statistics for the PC-12 and the BE 200 from any country outside of the United States, other than several NTSB Reports for foreign PC-12 and BE 200 aircraft that they investigated, it is only right for me to only use the statistics as they apply to the domestic fleet, therefore:

The accident statistics caused by Engine Failure that apply to the PC-12 and the BE 200 are as follows:

 

Since the beginning of 2000, for 370 PC-12 Aircraft there have been 2 accidents attributed to Engine Failure.

Since the beginning of 2000, for 1,153 BE 200 Aircraft there have been 2 accidents attributed to Engine Failure.

Which equates to:

2/370 = 0.0054 x 100 = 0.54%. Therefore the Risk Factor of having an Accident in a PC-12 due to Engine Failure equals 0.54%.

2/1,153 = 0.0017 x 100 = 0.17%. Therefore the Risk Factor of having an Accident in a BE 200 due to Engine Failure equals 0.17%.

0.54/0.17 = 3.176.

Therefore the likelihood of having an Accident in a PC-12 due to Engine Failure is more than three times that of a BE 200. Obviously further study needs to be made by including for example the Socata TBM 700 compared to the King Air C90B or Commander 690B, and the Piper Meridian against the Mitsubishi MU2 or Piper Cheyenne, etc. etc. I don't have time to do this, but I do believe that I am on to something here which pretty much confirms my own convictions in regards to Single Engine Turbine and Multi Engine Turbine Aircraft, i.e. for anything other than Flight Training or Single Pilot missions, a Multi Engine Turbine Aircraft must be selected over a Single Engine Turbine Aircraft! Stay with me on this. The statistical numbers as they apply to Piston powered Aircraft will, I am guessing, be the exact opposite of Turbine equipment. I believe that I actually read this to be true in a recent report that the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) issued, that compared Single Engine Pistons to Multi-Engine Pistons (Training, Complexity, Speed and Weight were the demons in this report.) Virtually every one of us starts our piloting careers in a Single Engine Aircraft. However as we progress through our ratings and gain more experience, most of us, if we make a career out of carrying passengers either part 91 – corporate, or commercially, will end up flying multi-engine, turbine powered aircraft. It takes training, experience, usually ratings and more training to fly turbine aircraft, regardless of how many ‘donkeys' hang from it's nose, wings or tail. The insurance companies have made sure of this, therefore the argument that a Single Engine Aircraft is safer for a private pilot to fly compared to a Multi due to less complexity and issues with asymmetric thrust, etc. just does not wash with me when we are discussing turbine aircraft. Unless of course, you choose not to carry any insurance, then all bets are off. I know that an almost fifty percent lower Direct Operating Cost per Flight Hour is damn attractive to a business owner and corporate accountant, but consider this scenario: You are flying high over a thick overcast that extends to the ground, it is night and you are currently overhead somewhere really hospitable (NOT! - for a forced landing, that is) like the Rockies or Adirondacks and your engine begins to give you unusual and expensive noises along with rapidly failing performance. I bet you that right at this very moment there is no amount of money too much, that you or your passengers would not be willing to pay for a second engine, assuming of course you are in a Single Engine Turbo-Prop Aircraft and the only engine that you have got is failing!

I know that I am setting myself up for some real abuse from anyone that works for, or currently owns a Pilatus, Socata, Piper, or Cessna, Single Engine Turbine Aircraft, but I could not with any good conscience respond to my client with the words: "Go for it, a Single Engine Turbine is the way to go as your corporate aircraft," because I personally don't believe this, and further more I feel that the Risks far outweigh the Cost Benefits of operating a Single Engine Turbine Aircraft for passenger operations over a Multi-Engine Turbine Aircraft.

Okay now it's your turn. Flame me! Please post your comments below and try not to call me too many nasty names!

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Jeremy Cox

Safety is Everyone's Responsibility

by Jeremy Cox 1. October 2005 00:00
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Before I get into my topic for this month I would like to talk about this month's poll at the front page of this GlobalAir.com web-site. You probably noticed that Jeffery, the Webmaster and Publisher of this site, has chosen to highlight the major infrastructural change that the Flight Information Service is currently undergoing. Instead of being a government owned and run institution, the FAA will place the responsibility of providing weather and flight planning services to General Aviation into the hands of a civilian contractor. This passing of the baton between the US Government and a civilian contractor went smoothly when the DUAT system became a privately run-public service, therefore by my reckoning this latest transition should also go smoothly. What do you think? If you came straight to this article without voting, shame on you! Please go back to the main page and make your voice heard because as you have seen in past visits to this site, this is supposed to be an interactive media site. Interestingly enough, before we finally move on to my article for this month, here are some tidbits about the origins of weather classification and reporting that I gleaned by surfing the world-wide-web. About 340 BC the Greek philosopher Aristotle wrote Meteorologica, a treatise on natural philosophy. His works, although speculative, represented the sum of knowledge about the natural science, including weather and climate. At that time, anything that fell from the sky (including rain and snow) and anything that was in the sky (including clouds) were called meteors, from the Greek word meteoros, meaning "high in the sky." From meteoros comes the term meteorology.

A system of identifying clouds was proposed by French botanist and zoologist Jean Baptiste Lamarck in 1802, and a better system was proposed by English naturalist Luke Howard in 1803. With slight modification, Howard's system is still in use. Howard's system uses Latin words to describe clouds as they appear to an observer on the ground. High wispy clouds are called cirrus (from the Latin word for curl of hair); sheetlike clouds are called stratus (from the Latin word for layer); billowing, puffy clouds are called cumulus (from the Latin word for heap); and rain-producing clouds are called nimbus (from the Latin word for rain).

The National Weather Service, formerly United States Weather Bureau, government agency engaged in reporting, predicting, and studying the weather, including temperature, moisture, barometric pressure, and wind speed and direction, throughout the United States and its territories was established in 1870 under the direction of the Signal Corps of the U.S. Army, the Weather Bureau was transferred to the Department of Agriculture in 1891 and to the Department of Commerce in 1940. In 1965 it was made a branch of the Environmental Science Services Administration within the Commerce Department. In 1970 the Weather Bureau became a part of the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce and was officially renamed the National Weather Service.

Okay now let's focus on my topic this month: Safety is Everyone's Responsibility.

Last fall and winter was a damned period regarding executive aircraft operations in the United States. Almost every week there was at least one report of an approach, landing or departure accident where property damage, injuries or loss of life occurred. The Media had a field day throwing wild accusations against the safety record of our industry, yet further investigation proved their sensationalist reports completely unfounded.
Recent published statistics report that U.S. Commercial Airlines suffered an overall accident rate of 0.310 events per 100,000 flight hours; air taxi companies suffered 2.50 events per 100,000 flight hours; and corporate flight departments suffered 0.028 events per 100,000 flight hours. Obviously it appears that air charter operations do carry a higher risk than commercial airlines, but corporate operations are rated the absolute safest. These statistics utterly refute the media's claim that charter flying is fifty times more dangerous and corporate flying is almost three times more dangerous than airline flying. Now armed with accurate statistics, one asks how can we in the industry increase our vigilance and improve our statistical score? It must first be understood that pilots are NOT the only people responsible for safety. Technicians, line personnel, schedulers and dispatchers, company executives, owners, friends and family ALL have influence over SAFETY in executive aircraft operations. The U.S. Navy teaches an Operational Risk Management course which can be applied to aircraft operations. The principles of this course are as follow:

• Accept NO unnecessary risks
• Accept risk only when the benefits outweigh the cost
• Anticipate and manage risk by planning
• Make risk decisions at the right level
• Follow a five-step process:
        1. Identify Hazards
        2. Assess Hazards (based on severity and probability)
        3. Make Risk Decisions
        4. Implement Controls
        5. Supervise (watch for any changes)

The world is not a very big place anymore now that several corporate aircraft are capable of 14-hour legs. With these type design changes allowing vast distances to be covered, they also may increase fatigue. A normal sleep pattern and the ability to maintain a normal Circadian Rhythm is an easy way to increase the margin of safety. Unfortunately, fatigue is not exclusive to transcontinental flight. It also applies to business meeting hopping possible with a Citation or King Air around the U.S. According to scientists at the Fatigue Counter Measures Group at NASA, fatigue plays a dramatic role in accidents. It is said that people that have been awake for 16 hours or longer have the performance equivalent of 0.05 (percent) blood alcohol. And people who have been awake for 24 hours or more have a 0.10 (percent) blood alcohol equivalent. Cabin altitude is also a factor. A good night's sleep can make a dramatic difference in your safety margin.

Another important consideration is your Circadian Rhythm. It is much more tiring to depart at 2200 hours after you have been trying to bank sleep all day, than it is to depart at 0800 where you find yourself on a fairly normal Circadian Rhythm. It is imperative that a suitable rest time is allowed after a long flight that crosses many time zones and perhaps even the International Date Line.

The NBAA recommends that all corporate flight departments write their own Safety Program Manual that specifies standard operating rules for either a fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. Factors that should be covered in this manual include:

• Positioning Flights
• Maximum Duty Day
• Area of Operations, i.e., Increased RISK (South America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and South East Asia, etc.)
• Mountainous Terrain
• International Flight
• Night Flight/IMC
• Uncontrolled Airport
• Non-Precision Approach
• Runway Length less than 7000 feet
• Contaminated Runway

Safety is NO Accident! Being aware of the hazards is our first step to improve our overall score.

So what procedures and checklists do you personally employ to ensure that you are ensuring the highest level of safety responsibility in your own flight operations? Any input that you care to make will be of great interest to all of the readers here at Globalair.com. So please don't be bashful and go ahead and write your comments and suggestions here.

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Jeremy Cox



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